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How International Institutions Evolve
Anu Bradford*

Abstract
Economic theory suggests that internationalinstitutions cannot simultaneously widen and
deepen. There is an inevitable trade-off between the benefits of site and the costs of beterogeneity.
Consequently, institutions ought to be either small and deep or, alternativey, large and shallow.
Yet in reality, we observe that international institutions embrace new members while
concurrentlypursuing deeper cooperation. This Article seeks to explain how institutions evolve
over time in light of this siZe/heterogeneity trade-off It examines the strategic responses of
members of institutions to heterogeneity costs and identifies two distinctyet related strategiesthat
allow states to pursuegainsfrom cooperation while suppressing heterogeneity costs: states seek to
reduce the heterogeneity costs by either overriding the preferences of prospective or incumbent
member states (consent tailoring) or, alternatively, by pursuing the strategy of accommodation
through institutionaladjustment (institutionaltailoring). The chosen strategy is determined by
the relative bargainingpower of the members of the institution. Explainingthe likely occurrence
and expected sequence of these two strategies paves the way for a descriptive theory of
institutional change. At the same time, this anaLytical framework explains how and why
institutions have evolved to be both wider and deeper over time, contrary to the predictions of
many economists.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Economic Foundations of InternationalLaw by Eric Posner and Alan Sykes
represents a significant contribution to an area of law that, for a long time,
insulated itself from the insights of law and economics.' While several other
fields of law embraced economic analysis decades ago, the rational choice
approach to international law has been slower to emerge. After the publication
of this book, however, it is difficult for anyone to deny the analytical value that
economics offers in enhancing our ability to understand how international law
operates.
Among its many important contributions, the book offers an insightful and
nuanced overview of the law and economics of international institutions.' The
authors discuss the conditions under which states delegate authority to
international institutions and explain why such delegation is rare. Different
values and interests across states make it challenging to settle on the goals and
rules of an international institution. For the same reason, states are unable to
agree on when and how to effectively discipline the institution. These high
agency costs lead states to steer away from extensive delegation in most
instances, explaining the weakness of many international institutions that
currently exist.
Despite these challenges, international institutions have proliferated across
different areas of international law. These institutions vary enormously in their
size and scope. Most institutions are set up to produce and preserve public
goods such as free trade, national security, or environmental sustainability.
Increasing the number of participants in these institutions allows states to take
advantage of economies of scale, hence expanding the availability and sharing
the costs of these public goods. However, the pursuit of joint gains takes place
within constraints, the most important of which are heterogeneity costs. States
hold divergent views as to the precise sectors of the economy that ought to be
liberalized, the gravity of various security threats, and the appropriate ways to
respond to them, as well as the fair and efficient allocation of responsibilities for
environmental protection. An increased membership thus contributes not only
to greater gains but also to greater costs as the public goods can no longer be
tailored to satisfy the individual preferences of the diverse membership. The
optimal size of an institution is determined by this size/heterogeneity trade-off.3
Embracing a transaction-costs approach to international institutions, Posner and

1

ERIC A. POSNER & AIAN 0. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

2

See id. at 79-112.

3

ALBERTO AI.ESINA & ENRICO SPOlAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS 205 (2003) (discussing the

economies of scale/heterogeneity of preferences tradeoff in European integration).
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Sykes acknowledge this trade-off and treat it as a central explanatory variable to
the institutional variation we observe.
This Article builds on this key insight. It examines how international
institutions respond to the growing preference heterogeneity across their
membership that risks undermining the ability of these institutions to deliver
public goods. Economic theory suggests that international institutions cannot
simultaneously widen and deepen.4 There is an inevitable trade-off between the
benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Consequently, institutions ought
to be either small and deep or, alternatively, large and shallow. Yet in reality, we
observe that international institutions embrace new members while concurrently
pursuing deeper cooperation.
This Article seeks to explain how institutions evolve over time in light of
the size/heterogeneity trade-off. It examines the strategic responses of members
of institutions to heterogeneity costs and identifies a number of bargaining
techniques and institutional design mechanisms that follow from the presence of
this trade-off. This inquiry paves the way for a descriptive theory of institutional
change. At the same time, this analytical framework also enhances our
understanding of how and why institutions have evolved to be both wider and
deeper over time, contrary to the predictions of some economists.
Economic analysis of international institutions assumes that states seek to
maximize gains from cooperation while minimizing the costs on their
sovereignty. This Article identifies two distinct yet related strategies that allow
states to pursue gains from cooperation while suppressing heterogeneity costs:
consent tailoring and institutional tailoring. States seek to reduce the heterogeneity

costs by either overriding the preferences of prospective or incumbent member
states (consent tailoring) or, alternatively, by pursuing the strategy of
accommodation through institutional adjustment (institutional tailoring). The
chosen strategy is determined by the relative bargaining power of the members
of the institution.
To simplify the analysis, we can distinguish between incumbent and
prospective members in an international institution. We can further divide the
states into proponents of more extensive institutional cooperation (cooperative
members) and opponents thereof (uncooperative members). The cooperative
members seek to deepen the existing level of cooperation among parties by
increasing delegation. This may entail expanding the institution into new policy
areas or assuming deeper substantive commitments within the existing policy
areas. The uncooperative members seek to halt the evolution of the institution
4

Id By widening, we typically refer to the broadening of the membership to include new states. By
deepening, we typically refer to expanding the substantive scope of the institution to embrace new
areas of cooperation.
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into new issue areas or towards deeper commitments. Thus, the description of
states as "cooperative" or "uncooperative" members here only refers to their
willingness to cooperate in matters that would further deepen the substantive
scope of the institution, which is central to our understanding of how
institutions evolve.
When cooperative members have leverage over uncooperative members,
the former typically resort to consent tailoring. This strategy is most discernible
at the stage when a prospective member state is proactively seeking admission to
an institution and can therefore be subjected to various entry conditions. These
accession conditions ensure that new members subscribe to the policies favored by
existing members. In other words, the new members' preferences can be
overridden and their consent tailored to conform to the preferences of existing
members. Cooperative states have less leverage over uncooperative incumbents
as opposed to uncooperative prospective member states. Accordingly,
cooperative members may be required to offer transferpayments in exchange for
the existing uncooperative members' consent and cooperation. This strategy may
still allow cooperative members to extract the consent of the initially
uncooperative members-but at a price. In addition to accession conditions and
transfer payments, qualitative majority voting rules can also be seen as a mode of
consent tailoring in that they force the minority to subscribe to the preferences
of the majority. Finally, at times cooperative states are able to harness courts to
suppress the preferences of the uncooperative members and thus enhance the
degree of delegation to their preferred equilibrium.
Sometimes consent tailoring is not available. In such instances cooperative
members resort to institutional tailoring to contain heterogeneity costs.
Institutional tailoring can consist of accommodating uncooperative members by
agreeing to diferentiated obligations or, when necessary, allowing uncooperative
member states to altogether opt out of additional cooperation in order to still be
able to deepen delegation among a smaller group of cooperative member states.
Here, the key difference to consent tailoring is that uncooperative members have
the leverage-they make the cooperative members adjust as opposed to the
other way around.
Often, consent tailoring and institutional tailoring take place in sequence.
Institutions are conventionally first formed among a small group of like-minded
states, focusing on issues where those states' preferences are aligned. Thus,
institutions often start off as more homogeneous without any discernible
size/heterogeneity trade-off that would undermine cooperation. Divergences
begin to emerge as states seek to deepen or widen the institution. Initial
widening or deepening can often be accomplished through consent tailoring.
States are screened and, if needed, homogenized at the accession stage. If
necessary, states are also likely to be able to identify transfer payments and
thereby successfully tailor their members' consent, albeit at some cost. But as
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heterogeneity further increases-either as a result of widening or deepening or,
as often today, as a result of the simultaneous pursuit of both-states have to
identify new ways to suppress heterogeneity and preserve the relevance and
effectiveness of the institution.
After a certain threshold of diversity is reached within an institution,
institutional tailoring becomes inevitable. An inquiry into evolving dynamics of
some key institutions, such as the WTO, the EU, and NATO, reinforces the
conclusion that after this threshold is met, consent tailoring alone is rarely
feasible. At this point, universal obligations give way to differentiated
responsibilities. It is no longer viable to expect all members of the institution to
subscribe to all decisions taken within the institution. Given the depth of
divergence in preferences, such a strategy would lead to lowest common
denominator agreements that would erode the credibility and effectiveness of
the institution. Ultimately, the only way to preserve the relevance of the
institutions and capture optimal gains from cooperation is to allow for different
groups within an institution to pursue deeper integration and hence allow "clubs
within clubs" or "treaties within treaties" to emerge.
Examples of differentiated integration include the creation of the
Eurozone among select members of the EU or the adoption of the Schengen
Agreement that removes internal border controls within a subset of EU
members along with some nonmember European states.s The Agreement on
Government Procurement in the WTO' offers a further example of institutional
tailoring where only some members of the WTO pursue deeper cooperation
among themselves. NATO's recent missions reveal a similar pattern: a small
number of allies carry out military operations selectively without the
involvement of the entire membership. These arrangements allow for "coalitions
of the willing" to proceed with further integration and new commitments,
preventing the uncooperative members from holding up efforts to deepen
cooperation by exercising veto rights and engaging in other blocking tactics.
While the primary goal of this Article is to offer a rational explanation for
institutional evolution, the discussion also has normative implications. Consent
tailoring and institutional tailoring provide that the two core principles of
international law-consent and universality-cannot be simultaneously

5

6

The Schengen Acquis-Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany
and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders
[hereinafter Schengen Agreement],June 14, 1985,2000 0.J.(L 239) 13.
Agreement on Government Procurement, 1989 U.N.T.S. 508 (text available at 1915 UNTS 103).
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accomplished as institutions evolve.7 Consent tailoring compromises the former
whereas institutional tailoring compromises the latter. The continuing adherence
to both state consent and universality inevitably leads to weak institutions where
a large number of states codify the lowest common denominator among them.
Such institutions exist but rarely influence state behavior. To retain their
effectiveness-and, consequently, their relevance-institutions must move away
from one or the other. This descriptive observation leads to a normative
conclusion, suggesting that effective international institutions increasingly rest
on foundations that lack the support of one of the two core principles
underlying conventional accounts of international law.
Finally, by arguing that institutional tailoring allows states to optimize
between size and heterogeneity, this Article provides a normative defense for
differentiated integration. The idea of differentiated integration is not new. The
trend towards differentiated integration has been recognized in scholarly and
political debates alike.' However, conventionally, this development has been
viewed as a suboptimal, interim, or second-best solution. Plurilateral agreements
are expected to evolve into multilateral agreements and arrangements like the
Eurozone to embrace new members over time. In contrast to these views, this
Article suggests that all clubs within clubs should not necessarily evolve to
ultimately comprise all members of the institution. Instead, if one takes the
cost/heterogeneity trade-off seriously, differentiated integration can be a
desirable end goal of international cooperation in that it allows states to optimize
on this trade-off by maximizing the net gains from cooperation in all instances.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II describes the international
political environment within which international institutions operate today.
Section III discusses how institutions evolve in this environment. It identifies
the dual strategies of consent tailoring and institutional tailoring that states
employ to manage the heterogeneity costs in their pursuit of gains from
institutionalized cooperation and predicts their relative prevalence and expected
sequence. Section IV touches on some limits of these strategies, and sketches
some extensions to this analytical framework. The conclusion, found in Section
V, highlights the key normative implications that follow from the discussion.

7

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 24, 40, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (laying
out the fundamental principle of international law according to which all parties to a treaty must
consent to it); see also Stephen C. Neff, A Short History ofInternationaLaiw,in INTERNATIONAL LAW
31, 40-41, 52-56 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1st ed. 2003) (discussing the expectation of universal
obligations under international law).

8

For discussion, see generaly Desmond Dinan, F:fp Years of Eumpean Community Law: A Remarkabk
Achievement, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118 (2008).
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II. BETWEEN MULTILATERALISM AND UNILATERALISM
from
nuclear
action
problems-ranging
collective
Pressing
nonproliferation to climate change and from terrorism to new forms of
protectionism-are increasingly complex and global today. Domestic economies
are intertwined, requiring a coordinated response during economic downturns
and times of financial crisis. Efforts to protect the environment, curtail
protectionism, and fight terrorism similarly require sustained international
cooperation to be effective. The nature of these challenges may be distinct, but
they all share the common feature of being transnational and beyond any single
state's ability to solve alone.
At the same time, the distribution of power among states is more dispersed
than ever. The number of influential states whose preferences shape outcomes
has grown. The world lacks any single hegemon that could independently
provide global public goods. The US, while still the most powerful nation, has
seen its brief moment of hegemony following the collapse of the Soviet Union
give way to a multipolar world. The problems underlying the Eurozone have
made the EU turn inwards, compromising its efforts to exercise global
leadership. China, together with other fast growing economies, has gained
substantial global influence but has not yet assumed the role of a global
hegemon, both for lack of capacity as well as ambition. Today, several states are
powerful yet no state is powerful enough to get anything done alone. As a result,
unilateralism seldom remains an option.
Yet, right at the time that unilateralism has met its limits, multilateralism is
also becoming exceedingly difficult to accomplish. States' preferences are
increasingly diverse and, as a result, their priorities and policies difficult to
reconcile. This growing heterogeneity stems from differences in key states'
incomes and regulatory capacities, as well as their varying political and economic
ideologies. Some may argue that this has always been the case: states' interests
have always diverged across a number of important issues, undermining
multilateral cooperation.' However, the difference today lies in the number of
states whose preferences matter. Powerful countries can no longer ignore the
vast number of states whose relative influence on the world stage has grown.
Fast-growing emerging markets account for an increasing share of the global
economic output, giving these states a say in issues relevant to the world
economy. One manifestation of this is the growing influence of China and India,
and their subsequent tendency to exercise veto rights in institutions such as the

9

See, for example, Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is
Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 INT'L ORG. 73 (2000); Gabriella Blum, Bi/ateralism, Mullateraksm,
and the Architecture ofInternationalLaw, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 334-39 (2008).
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WTO. This represents a palpable shift from the times when the US and the EU
alone dictated the terms of WTO agreements and imposed their preferences on
developing economies."
Multilateral cooperation is further complicated by the constantly shifting
nature of alliances. Today, states form alliances on a case by case basis,
depending on their interests in any given issue area." China and Germany are
both creditors, whose interests in matters of international finance can more
easily be aligned as a result. Yet the two disagree on most other global issues,
ranging from combating climate change to advancing human rights. The
international security environment is more complicated as the world is no longer
neatly divided along the lines of the Cold War. Instead, idiosyncratic historical
and regional ties and grievances define national security interests among
traditional allies. Traditionally, the EU was viewed as a relatively homogeneous
block of states sharing fundamental values and possessing high standards of
living. However, today it is comprised of a membership featuring a diverse range
of income levels and different economic and political histories. On some issues,
the northern EU states have interests at odds with those of the southern states.
But on others, intra-EU alliances and voting patterns shift depending on the
individual member state's trade balance, the share of agricultural production of
the economy, energy infrastructure, socioeconomic challenges, the salience of
organized labor, or the strength of environmental interests.
How are international institutions affected by mounting heterogeneity?
Growing preference diversity within institutions raises the costs of cooperation.
Contracting costs increase and delays become common. Negotiations end in
deadlocks and any agreements, when reached, reflect watered down
compromises. Lowest common denominator outcomes follow whenever the
most reluctant member of the institution is able to set the pace and terms for
cooperation. At worst, heterogeneity paralyzes the institution, bringing
multilateralism to a halt.
Examples of states steering away from traditional multilateralism are
numerous. Tired of deadlocks, delays, and costly compromises, some states are
losing their faith in established institutions. Resurgent regionalism is replacing
multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO: states have concluded over 200
bilateral and regional trade agreements since the WTO's (thus far unsuccessful)

10 See Richard Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargainingand Outcomes in the

11

GAIT/T'O, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 349, 359-60, 366 (2002) ("The raw use of power to close the
Uruguay Round via the single undertaking best exemplifies transatlantic domination of the
GATT/1VTO, despite the sovereign equality decisionmaking rules there.").
William Burke-White, Rising Powers and the Future ofInternationalLaw,passim (forthcoming) (on file
with author).
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Doha Round was launched in 2001.12 The entire legal framework for regulating
foreign direct investment relies on bilateral treaties and nobody is seriously
discussing the revival of past attempts to negotiate a multilateral investment
agreement. 13
Even when states continue to work within existing institutions, they
commonly evade traditional multilateralism. There is an emerging awareness that
NATO might be evolving towards a multitier affiance. Consensus on the proper
role of the affiance is missing. The strategic rift among the allies is widening. The
divergence of interests has been palpable in issues ranging from missile defense
to enlargement and NATO's dealings with Russia, and from the 2008 crisis in
Georgia to the alliance's continuing commitment in Afghanistan. At the same
time, members need to exploit greater economies of scale to reconcile their
unwillingness to spend more on defense and their awareness of continuing and
new security threats. This pressing need to pool resources in the midst of
dwindling defense budgets provides perhaps the most compelling rationale for
the continuation of the alliance, which some have argued has outlived its
usefulness. Yet in a more fragmented security environment, it is likely that
countries will engage in NATO missions with increasing selectivity following the
recent example of Libya. Going forward, NATO members are expected to
continue to pick and choose the missions in which they participate.
The EU pursues deeper integration among some subsets of member states,
the Eurozone and the Schengen Agreementl4 being the most prominent
examples of this trend. Instead of adhering to classic multilateralism, the
prevailing tendency is for states to form ad hoc coalitions of the willing, which
pursue joint gains tailored to their preferences, leaving behind the delays and
dysfunctions associated with rigid institutions and costly multilateralism.
Another consequence of deadlocked political decisionmaking within
institutions is a shift from the institutions' role in the political provision of
public goods to the judicial maintenance of those goods." While some may
argue that institutions have exhausted their ability to negotiate new gains, they
nonetheless still matter in that they can preserve existing gains. When the pivotal
12

13

14
'5

See Regional Trade Agreements. Facts and Figures, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region-e/regfac-e.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) for a
table depicting growth of RTAs from 1948-2014.
See Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fty-Year Quest for the Elusive Mulilateral
Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 275 (2000) (discussing the failed MAI
negotiations).
See Schengen Agreement, supra note 5.
Joost Pauwelyn, New Trade Politics for the 21st Century, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 559, 565 (2008)
(emphasizing the DSM's role over the WTO's ability to facilitate future negotiations over new
concessions).
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role of institutions changes from pursuing gains to preserving them, the role of
courts and dispute settlement bodies grow at the expense of the political organs
of institutions. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism ("DSM")'6 at the WTO and
the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")" in the EU become key players in the era
of gain maintenance. The ECJ's role in promoting judicial integration within
Europe at times when political integration in the EU comes to a halt is well
understood." The international trade regime is experiencing a similar
development. The DSM has become more active as states experience increasing
difficulties in reaching political agreements. This development is consistent with
President Obama's recent announcement to devote more resources to trade
enforcement at a time when the US government invests no meaningful political
capital in concluding the WTO Doha Round negotiations. 9
Some observers of international relations have aptly described today's
political environment as an era of "messy multilateralism."20 In this period, grand
bargains and consensus are likely to be replaced by a more flexible and
pragmatic concept of international institutions where multiple tiers of
membership and differentiated speeds of integration become the norm. Strict
adherence to genuine multilateralism is beyond what these institutions operating
under current constraints of preference heterogeneity can deliver. At the same
time, unilateralism is increasingly beyond the capacity of any single state,
highlighting the need for collective action and continued burden sharing. States
pursue "multilateralism i la carte" on a case by case basis with different
combinations of allies that vary with states' specific interests and alignments in
each issue. In this new state of the world, traditional multilateralism and
international institutions either become irrelevant or are forced to adjust to the
less orderly reality. The next Section discusses how institutions are already
responding, and must continue to respond, to a world where boundaries
between sovereignty and solidarity are more elusive and where institutions are
operating on a new terrain between unilateralism and multilateralism.

16

17

18

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, The Legal Texts: The Results of
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M.
1226 (1994).
Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, available at http://
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201 2-1 0/stautcons-en.pdf.
See RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTEGRATION 71, 74-75, 97-116 (1998).

19
20

Exec. Order No. 13,601, 3 C.F.R. § 13601 (2013) (establishing the Interagency Trade
Enforcement Center).
Richard Haass, Comment, The Casefor Messy Mulilateralism,FIN. TIMES,Jan. 5, 2010, http://on.ft.
com/I708aE.
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III. How INSTITUTIONs EVOLVE
This Section explains how states can pursue deeper cooperation when their
preferences become increasingly diverse. Subsection A discusses how
international institutions have widened and deepened contrary to what economic
models would predict. Subsection B considers alternative explanations for this
development by revisiting the key assumptions under the relevant economic
models. Subsection C identifies two strategies-consent tailoring and
institutional tailoring-that states employ to accomplish deepening in the midst
of widening. It argues that these strategies form states' deliberate and rational
responses to preference heterogeneity and seeks to explain their relative
prevalence as well as expected sequence.
A. The Compatibility of Widening and Deepening: Theory
versus Reality
The standard view argues that institutions must choose between widening
and deepening.2' According to this view, the two goals are incompatible: the
trade-off between gains from expanded membership and costs from increasing
heterogeneity inevitably suggests that an institution with an expansive mandate
will be favored by few states whereas an institution with a constrained mandate
will attract a large number of states. Thus, we should observe an inverse
relationship between widening and deepening in international institutions.22
Yet in reality, both the membership and the mandate of institutions tend to
grow over time. The key institutions today are both wider and deeper than they
were at their inception. The six-member European Coal and Steel Community,
founded in 1952, has evolved into the twenty-eight-member EU today. The
WTO has grown from twenty-three GATT members in 1947 to 159 WTO
members to date. NATO had twelve members in 1949 and twenty-eight
members today. And while new members continue to join these institutions,
exits remain rare. No member state has ever withdrawn from the EU.
Greenland, which holds semiautonomous status as part of Denmark, departed
from the European Economic Community (the EU's predecessor) in 1985.
France withdrew from NATO's integrated military command structures in 1966,
only to resume its full membership in 2009. Similarly, Greece briefly withdrew

21

Michael

J.

Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-Off in InternationalMultilateral Agreements?, 58

INT'L ORG. 459,459 (2004). See also ALESINA & SPOLAORE, supra note 3, at 205.
22

See Giligan, supra note 21, at 459.
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from NATO in 1974 but rejoined in 1980. No member has left the WTO to
date.23
Alongside their growing memberships, the mandates of institutions have
expanded. Institutions' prerogatives are rarely removed while new issues and
capacities are constantly added to their purview. The EU started off as an
institution narrowly focused on integrating western European steel and coal
industries before moving to establish a customs union and removing internal
trade barriers soon thereafter. The competences of the EU have subsequently
grown from comprising purely economic and trade matters to embracing issues
ranging from environmental and consumer protection to social policy, transport,
public health, and criminal justice. The WTO has similarly evolved from an
institution established to dismantle tariffs on goods to an institution that
regulates a wide range of nontariff barriers, dumping, subsidies, and a host of
new issues such as intellectual property rights and trade in services. And after
losing its traditional adversary with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
conclusion of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has been repurposed towards new
enemies and vested with new responsibilities in conflict prevention-those
conflicts entailing previously uncharted military, political, economic and ethnic
dimensions.
B. Revisiting the Assumptions on Heterogeneity Costs and
Gains from Cooperation
Before proceeding to explain the presumed incompatibility between
widening and deepening, it is important to consider whether the assumptions
underlying economic models that have led to this prediction are justified. One
alternative explanation for simultaneous widening and deepening could be that
growing membership does not, in fact, always lead to greater heterogeneity costs.
Second, it might also be that the increase in the gains from cooperation exceeds
the rate at which heterogeneity costs grow with new members. Both possibilities
would explain why international institutions have managed to widen and deepen
at the same time. Finally, the authors of these models themselves attribute this
development to political forces that defy the economic logic underpinning their
models. Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore, for instance, point to bureaucratic
capture in the EU context: EU institutions, as states' agents, have managed to
obtain powers from their principals to the extent that it has enabled them to

23

Conversely, exits are expected to be more likely outside the club goods. See discussion on the
different dynamics characterizing club good versus public good institutions, infra Section III.B.2.
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proceed with deeper cooperation regardless of the heterogeneity costs.24 These
alternative explanations are discussed below in turn.
1. Heterogeneity costs.
Economic models that predict the formation of small and deep or,
alternatively, large and shallow institutions assume that heterogeneity costs
increase with the size of the institution.2 5 Accepting new members introduces
new preferences and makes consensus harder to reach. This seems intuitively
obvious. However, others may argue that increased interaction within
institutions leads to a greater diffusion of ideas, which gradually aligns states'
interests. This tendency towards homogeneity can offset, or even exceed, any
tendencies towards heterogeneity. Heterogeneity costs, according to this view,
may thus on balance decline as opposed to increase over time, enabling states to
pursue deeper integration despite the growing membership.
That state preferences are likely to gradually align following increased
interaction is consistent with constructivist theories of international cooperation.
But it could also be explained by rationalist arguments. Consider the EU. Over
time, the EU has harmonized numerous laws and regulations. As a result,
domestic policies have converged to a significant degree across the EU member
states. These past harmonization measures should lower the adjustment costs
associated with subsequent cooperation efforts given the greater proximity of
domestic policies at that later moment. International trade serves as another
example of how states' interests may become aligned over time. Increased trade
liberalization has made supply chains increasingly global. This has contributed to
an increase in intraindustry trade, thereby aligning the interests of exporters and
importers. When exporters predominantly rely on foreign inputs as sources of
supply, protectionism becomes less viable: restriction of imports hurts domestic
producers (including exporters) who use imports as components in their
production, making protectionism a self-defeating strategy. As a result, states
should be increasingly endorsing the same set of (pro-free trade) policies. This
challenges the prediction that heterogeneity costs, on balance, would always be
greater in Time 2 compared to Time 1 as long as the membership has grown
between those two time periods.
However, while some characteristics of states become more homogeneous
over time-for instance, participation in international trade increases all WTO
members' trade levels and, consequently, economic growth-other differences
remain, failing to shift all states towards the institution's "median voter" in a
number of matters. For example, while China's trade levels approximate those of
24
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the US and the EU today, China insists that its GDP per capita shows that it
remains a developing country in need of differential treatment. It also continues
to adhere to some protectionist policies, including low levels of intellectual
property protection and intervention in currency markets, despite more than a
decade of interaction with its trading partners in the WTO.
Even shared characteristics among member states do not always ensure
that these countries' interests will be aligned and their heterogeneity costs
contained. In other words, homogeneity in characteristics can still translate into
heterogeneity in interests. Consider the following example. We expect existing
members of an institution to support the inclusion of new members that share
their particular preferences or characteristics. This should reinforce the
bargaining power of their favored coalitions within an institution. However,
whether to support the accession of a new member can entail a more complex
calculation of how this accession will impact the interests of existing members.
For instance, in an institution such as the EU that engages in redistributive
policies, the existing beneficiaries of these policies may be expected to support
the accession of other poorer countries that are likely to similarly favor the
inclusion of strongly redistributive elements in all policy making. At the same
time, these poorer countries are the expected cobeneficiaries of these policies,
sharing the future gains from those policies with existing poor member states
and thus potentially reducing the overall transfers that are available.26 Thus,
admitting even seemingly homogeneous countries into the organization may still
increase heterogeneity costs that impede the pursuit of joint gains.
Overall, it is doubtful that heterogeneity costs as a general matter have
become less severe over time. Empirical evidence suggests that international
cooperation is getting harder in large part because of the growing diversity in
states' preferences and positions. Heterogeneity costs in international institutions
with universal membership have increased as the sheer number of states that
exists has increased over the years. Every decision today must accommodate an
even greater set of individual state preferences. WTO negotiations take longer to
conclude when there are more members participating in negotiations." The
deadlocks in the EU have become more common as heterogeneity costs have

26
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Similarly, France, with its strong agricultural interests, was expected to support the accession of
Poland and other heavily agricultural states that were likely to endorse the maintenance or even
further extension of the EU's agricultural subsidies. At the same time, French farmers knew that
the inclusion of these new agricultural producers was likely to reduce the subsidies available to the
existing farmers, complicating their preference formation relating to the accession.
Christoph Moser & Andrew K. Rose, Why Do Trade Negoiaions Take So Long?, 27 J. EcON.
INTEGRATION 280, 281, 284 (2012).

Summer 2014

61

ChicagoJournalof IntermationalLAw

become more severe.28 Even the ICJ's influence has arguably been compromised
as heterogeneity among the states has mounted.2 9
A further argument for the augmenting heterogeneity costs over the life of
the institution is the plausibility of international institutions being first formed
among like-minded states with largely similar income levels, economic policies,
and political leanings. As these countries seek to expand gains from cooperation,
they gradually begin to accept states that are less likely to share their preferences.
Thus, the sequence of accepting new members often takes place from less to
more heterogeneous states. Many international institutions reveal this pattern. 0
Another possibility is that while states' preferences may in some important
aspects become more similar with respect to issues that were subject to past
cooperation, issues that are subject to later negotiations invite more
disagreement. That is, increased heterogeneity is not driven by the sequence of
the identity of participants that are admitted in the institution but by the
sequence of issues subject to institutionalized cooperation. This assumes that
states tend to first address issues that exhibit lower sovereignty costs, over time
moving to cooperate on more controversial issues. Heterogeneity costs may thus
become higher simply because the "low-hanging fruit"-referring to issues with
unambiguous net benefits and little disagreement among states-has been
picked and cooperation has moved on to difficult issues where states' interests
are further apart and consensus harder to reach.
In the GAIT/WTO, states proceeded first to remove tariff barriers and
various other border measures that were less controversial than subsequently
negotiated "behind the border" measures, including domestic health and
environmental regulations that often reflect deeply embedded and highly varied
domestic preferences. Similarly, in the EU, cooperation has gradually moved to
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Seefor example, Catherine Barnard, The 'Opt-Out'forthe UK and Polandfrom the Charterof Fundamental
Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over Reality?, in THE LISBON TREATY 257 (Stefan Griller & Jacques Ziller
eds., 2008) (discussing differences in status of the UK-Poland Protocol); Frank Bohn & Eelke de
Jong, The 2010 Euro Crisis Stand-off Between Franceand Germany: Leadership Styles and PoliticalCulture, 8
INT'L. EcoN. POt'Y 7 (2011); Desmond Dinan, Governance and Insitutions: Implementing the lisbon
Treaty in the Shadow of the Euro Crisis, 49 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 103 (2011).
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However, at times, prospective gains are the greatest when cooperation is sought from countries
that exhibit very different characteristics-such as a capital -exporting country concluding an
investment treaty with a capital -importing country whose market has thus far been closed to
foreign investment--or by the inclusion of a strategically important treaty partner, regardless of
the high heterogeneity costs. Similarly, sometimes the participation of a single country can be
crucial for the success of an international treaty. An international climate change treaty without
China, for example, would hardly be effective. Similarly, the inclusion of "weak links" can be
more crucial in any antiterrorism organization compared to any countries of lesser strategic
importance.
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more sensitive issues, like where states have legitimate disagreements on how to
balance various domestic consumer or environmental protection measures with
the need to guarantee unrestricted trade within the common market. Thus, part
of the institutional evolution is the tendency to address issues in the order of
lower to higher heterogeneity costs.
2. Gains from public goods.
The above discussion suggests the economic models are right to assume
that heterogeneity costs typically increase as new members join the institution.
Yet another explanation for wide and deep institutions comes from the
possibility of greater-than-presumed net gains from a broad membership. To put
it more precisely, under this view, broader membership increases the gains from
the provision of public goods at a greater rate than the accompanying increase in
heterogeneity costs. This would provide states with the rationale to accept new
members despite some (more limited) increase in heterogeneity costs that a
larger and more diverse membership entails. The possibility that marginal net
gains from cooperation increase over time might be attributed to factors such as
economies of scale and scope or the importance of network effects.
At the same time, it is also conceivable that net gains from cooperation
diminish over time. States can be expected to cooperate first on issues where net
gains are least contested. Only after the greatest net gains have been obtained do
states move on to issues that offer lesser benefits as long as those benefits still
exceed their costs of cooperation. Net gains can thus diminish over time if the
most important benefits have already been pursued at the earlier stages of
institutionalized cooperation. This sequence from greater to lesser net gains may
explain the current stalemate at the WTO. Private interests are today less vocal
in supporting the conclusion of the ongoing WTO Doha Round. This may be
because businesses have already obtained the liberalization gains that were most
salient for them, and will not invest their remaining political capital to pursue the
lingering marginal gains.'
The magnitude of gains may also vary depending on the particular
relationship between the gains that are available from deepening versus the gains
that are available from widening the institution. Deepening and widening can be
viewed as strategic complements or strategic substitutes, and states forming an
international institution can identify widening and deepening either as alternative
or complementary paths for greater gains. If States A, B, and C initially formed a
free trade area for goods, they could later expand their gains by inviting State D
to join. This would constitute a strategy based on widening. Alternatively, States
31

Similarly, the marginal benefit of adding one more member to the WTO may be less valuable at
the point when incumbent members already have access to most of the world market.
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A, B, and C could achieve further gains by deepening cooperation amongst
themselves. They could, for instance, expand their free trade area to encompass
services in addition to goods. Here, their chosen strategy would consist solely of
deepening. However, often the greatest gains may be available from the pursuit
of a dual strategy of widening and deepening. For instance, A, B, and C may
derive the greatest benefit if they create a wider free trade area (including D's
market) while also expanding their institution to services.
If widening and deepening were strategic substitutes (in other words, where
resorting to one strategy reduces the desirability of pursuing the other), we
would expect only one or the other strategy to be chosen. A, B, and C may all
benefit from access to D's market for goods yet D's involvement in the
institution makes it less desirable to expand cooperation to services. This could
be the case, for example, if D were a net exporter of services to A, B, and C, yet
a net importer of goods from A, B, and C.32 However, if widening and
deepening were strategic complements (in other words, where resorting to one
strategy increases the desirability of pursuing the other), we would expect both
strategies to be chosen. For example, the free trade area in services might require
some institutional arrangements (including establishment of a DSM) that entail
high fixed costs-too high to be justified for a trade area consisting of A, B, and
C only. But if D were to share these fixed costs, the gains from expanding the
cooperation to services could be justified. Here, widening and deepening would
be seen as strategic complements.
It is therefore plausible that the observed pattern of simultaneous widening
and deepening reflects the idea of strategic complementarity as opposed to
strategic substitution. This complernentarity could also suggest that at times
gains from the provision of public goods, indeed, do increase at a greater rate
than the costs introduced by greater heterogeneity. However, it also leaves open
the possibility that while simultaneous widening and deepening can multiply
gains, this dual strategy can also multiply heterogeneity costs.
While we may not be able to detect a general and uniform pattern of
growing or diminishing gains from cooperation over time, we can be reasonably
confident that gains from cooperation are likely to change across years. States'
trade flows fluctuate, changing the benefits of gaining access to new markets as
well as the costs of the concessions given to any new trading partners. The
nature and extent of military threats change as states build or rein in their
military capacities and as adversarial governments rise to power or collapse. The
optimal level of cooperation with allies and trading partners changes with these
32

Under this hypothetical scenario, widening the institution to encompass D would hence make it
less desirable for A, B, and C to expand their cooperation to services (as D would reap the main
benefits from this strategy).
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internal and external events, leading at times to a need to broaden or deepen
cooperation. In sum, there are several reasons for institutional expansion, only
some of which might reflect the availability of greater net gains. The varied
reasons for institutions' sprawling memberships and expansive mandates cannot,
therefore, support the conclusion that broadening the institution to new
members can in any systematic way be attributed to greater net gains (relative to
the increase in heterogeneity costs) from large membership. This leaves the
simultaneous institutional widening and deepening to beg for another
explanation.
3. Politics and agency costs.
Another possibility is that the assumptions underlying the economic
models predicting certain institutional patterns are not flawed as such. They may
simply fail to capture the political reality that defies the logic of cost-benefit
analysis. Institutionalized cooperation creates a bureaucracy that has a vested
interest in growing the powers of the institution and thereby expanding its own
influence. Institutions' mandates may thus expand as part of the path
dependence phenomenon where the delegation itself becomes self-reinforcing.
Alesina and Spolaore argue that political forces created by institutions push
towards greater delegation despite the growing preference heterogeneity among
the members." The simultaneous deepening and widening of the EU, for
instance, can be explained by bureaucratic capture and the demographic deficit
that sustains this capture. This type of bureaucratic bias towards expanding the
depth of cooperation is consistent with basic assumptions of public choice
theory and our understanding of how international bureaucracies operate.
This explanation might be most compelling in the context of the EU,
which has taken supranationalism and the delegation to international institutions
further than any of its counterparts. It is true that the European integration has
created a sizeable bureaucracy with a powerful Commission at its center. Yet it is
hard to attribute the extensive widening and deepening of the EU only, or even
primarily, to bureaucratic capture. The member states still retain control over the
outcomes through their voting power in the Council, substantially constraining
the acts by the Commission. It therefore seems more appropriate to provide an
explanation where the EU member states remain at center stage. The following
discussion argues that the EU as an institution has departed from the prediction
of economic models because of systematic reliance on consent tailoring and
institutional tailoring. Extensive accession concessions, together with a reliance
on qualified majority voting ("QMV") and differentiated integration, have
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accommodated diversity and enabled broadening and widening even in the
absence of any demographic deficit.
The bureaucratic explanation model is even less helpful in describing the
broader trend; agency capture cannot explain developments in other
international organizations, which are even more strictly within the control of
their member states. The member states themselves, for instance, have retained
control and determine the fate of NATO and the WTO. With this observation
in mind, the below discussion emphasizes the role of states as principals in full
control over outcomes. It contends that deepening and widening take place not
just as a result of a bureaucratic coup or forces of path dependence. Members of
international institutions are not passive and powerless in the face of
international bureaucratic expansion. Instead, the size/heterogeneity trade-off
exists and states are keenly aware of it. As a result, member states seek to
actively preserve the gains from cooperation while minimizing heterogeneity
costs. To do this, they engage in a conscious strategy of consent tailoring and
institutionaltailoring in an effort to pursue institutionalized cooperation, mindful
of the trade-off. This dual strategy that straddles the ability to homogenize and
the need to accommodate offers an alternative-and, I would argue, a more
accurate-explanation for how institutions evolve, and why they continue to
deepen and widen at the same time.
C. Consent Tailoring and Institutional Tailoring
This Subsection argues that states employ two strategies that allow
institutions to simultaneously deepen and widen. First, states deliberately
suppress heterogeneity costs by homogenizing uncooperative members through
consent tailoring. Second, when forced to adjust, states accommodate
uncooperative members through the strategy of institutional tailoring. The
choice between the two strategies depends on the relative bargaining power of
cooperative and uncooperative members of the institution.
1. Consent tailoring.
The below discussion identifies four forms of consent tailoring: accession
conditions, transfer payments, majority voting rules, and delegation to courts.
These strategies can be harnessed, together or in isolation, to curtail
heterogeneity costs. What they have in common is that they compromise the
pure form of consent by suppressing the preferences of uncooperative
members.34 Their use is therefore expected to positively correlate with the

3

Note that these are not the exclusive strategies for suppressing consent. Threats, sanctions,
rewards, and variations of such are also employed to influence behavior and outcomes.
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amount of power held by cooperative members in any given bargaining
situation.
Consent tailoring is most common and often most successful at the stage
when a prospective member state seeks access to an existing institution that
provides so-called "club goods." For instance, the WTO, the EU, and NATO all
generate benefits that extend to their members exclusively. New members
clamoring to get into the club have diminished bargaining leverage due to the
existing members' ability to exclude them from the benefits that the institution

provides. Each time a new member seeks admission, the incumbent members
have significant leverage against the prospective entrant, extracting extensive
concessions before the entrant is admitted to the institution. Consequently,
admission criteria are some of the most viable and visible ways to preempt
heterogeneity costs. Numerous institutions screen their members and maintain a
high price for entry by subjecting new member states to tough accession
conditions. These conditions homogenize the preferences of a new member and
thereby mitigate, ex ante, subsequent cooperation problems.
The length of accession negotiations at the WTO or the EU, together with
the extensive conditions under which the eventual accessions takes place,
provide evidence that states use the admission process as an important
bargaining tool.35 This pre-entry homogenization is seen as an effective way to
prevent problems stemming from high heterogeneity costs once the member is
admitted and the institution thereby expanded. Obviously, the new member is
expected to subscribe to the existing policies of the institution. But heterogeneity
costs are also likely to be reduced with respect to new policies. Economic or
political reforms that a prospective member must undertake frequently change
the constellation of domestic interests and build regulatory capacity more
generally. These reforms suppress political resistance and alleviate economic
adjustment costs that would otherwise hinder policy measures proposed in the
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See, for example, Heather Grabbe, European Union Conditionaity and the Acquis Communautaire, 23
INT'L POL. SCIENCE REv. 249, 252-53 (2002) (examining the EU's accession conditions and how
their ambiguity increases the EU's bargaining power in accession negotiations); Raj Bhala, Enter
the Dragon:An Essay on China's WO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469 (2000) (mapping
the extensive history of negotiations regarding China's accession to the WTO); Julia Ya Qin,
"lVTO-Plus" Obhgations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System: An
Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003) (analyzing the additional
and stringent rules applied to China); Abdur Chowdhury,
Accession: What's in it for Russia?
(William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 595, 2003), available at http://deepblue.ib.umich
.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/39981/wp595.pdf (discussing the history and challenges of
Russia's WTO accession negotiations); see also THOMAS S. SZAYNA, NATO ENIARGEMENT 2000-
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(outlining the timeline and criteria for decisionmaking with regard to admission of new NATO
members).
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future. Admission-stage homogenization is therefore often the most effective
way to ensure that a new member's conduct will conform to the preferences of
the median voter within the institution, and thereby not obstruct the existing
members' efforts to pursue future gains.
However, it may not be sufficient to simply obtain a promise from the
candidate country that it will subscribe to certain policies. Greece was made
subject to the Eurozone's stability rules when joining the common currency.36
Later, it became obvious that Greece had breached those rules, highlighting the
need for an effective monitoring and enforcement apparatus to hold states to
their commitments.37 Romania and Bulgaria were required to carry out
significant reforms to promote the rule of law and undertake institutional and
political reforms before gaining access to the EU." Yet their adherence to rule
of law as well as ability and willingness to guarantee the independence of the
judiciary has been repeatedly questioned since.3 9 The commitment to
fundamental elements of democracy in Hungary is similarly eroding.40 And the
EU is not alone in struggling to prevent its members from backsliding. Russia
and China's records of compliance with the WTO rules have been mixed despite
the extensive commitments both undertook as part of their accession
processes.4 1 Thus, monitoring, enforcement, and the prospect of sanctions may
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See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 140, May
9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.
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See, for example, Report from the Commission of the European Communities-Greece- Report Prepared in
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omy-finance/economic-governance/sgp/pdf/30_edps/104-03/2009-02-18 el 104-3 en.pdf.
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See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Progress in Romania under the
Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (Jan. 30, 2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/
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resolution of 16 February 2012), Eur. Parl. Doc. (A7 229) 20013 (2013), available at http://www.
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Russia,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (June 2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/06192013%20Russia%20WfTO%20Enforcement%20Report.pdf; United States
Trade Representative, 2011 Report to Congress on China's IVTO Compliance, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
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be needed to ensure that new members are homogenized and heterogeneity
costs are contained in practice as well.
The ability to homogenize preferences becomes more difficult once these
new members are admitted into the institution. The new members now have a
vote and hence an enhanced ability to resist policies that contradict their
preferences. Here, cooperative members may still be able to engage in consent
tailoring but such tailoring takes place under new constraints. Cooperative
members are more likely to have to offer various transfer payments to "buy" the
preference alignment of uncooperative members. A well-known example of this
kind of institutionalized transfer payment is the conclusion of the TRIPS
Agreement within the WTO.4 2 There, developed countries offered to liberalize
trade in textiles and agriculture in return for developing countries agreeing to
protect intellectual property rights. Without such linkage, developing countries
would not have agreed to undertake IP commitments, which were expected to
bring few gains and impose significant costs on them.43
Similarly, costless consent tailoring is rarely available, even at the accession
stage, outside the club good context where incumbent members hold significant
sway. The EU, the WTO, or NATO all provide "excludable" goods; that is, the
member states of these institutions can exclude the nonmembers from the
benefits associated with the membership. The ability of these institutions to
reserve the benefits they create for the members of the club only increases the
attractiveness of the accession to the institution. In contrast, in the case of public
goods, which are "nonexcludable," incumbent members seek to persuade a
recalcitrant member state to join the institution in an effort to have them share
the costs of the provision of such goods. This task is challenging, as the
outsiders are often better off remaining outside the institution and free riding on
the other states' efforts. Consider, for instance, a new institution established to
tackle climate change that seeks to persuade China to join its mission to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. China gains nothing by joining the institution: by
staying outside, it remains free to continue to emit, yet is able to enjoy any
improvement in the climate thanks to other states' efforts." Here, cooperative
members have none of the bargaining leverage akin to what they held when
China was actively seeking to join the WTO. They are left with the option to
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It is, however, true that at times states seek to join an institution that imposes some costs or
obligations on them (be they related to protection of human rights or environmental interest or
some other policies not innately supported by the country assuming the obligations). One
motivation to do so relates to their desire to enhance their reputation and signal to other states
their commitment to certain laudable principles and policies.
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offer transfer payments sufficiently large to change China's incentives to join the
public goods institution. Thus, in situations where an uncooperative member's
bargaining power is enhanced-be it due to the possibility of free riding or due
to leverage gained after accession-consent tailoring is likely to be accomplished
only at a price.4
Transfer payments, while common, are not always available to accomplish
homogenization.46 Such transfers can be too economically costly or too
politically contentious to implement. If transfer payments consist of concessions
in some other issue area, a new set of vested interests are brought in, triggering
political resistance and complicating the dynamics of the bargaining. Another
plausible homogenization strategy that states may have, then, is the ability to
override uncooperative states' preferences with majority voting rules as long as
those states constitute a minority within an institution. Some institutions, most
notably the EU, have moved away from the requirement of unanimity towards
qualified majority voting rules in many issue areas.47 Growing heterogeneity and
subsequent holdouts have gridlocked EU decisionmaking, leading members to
give up consensus voting. However, as QMV entails that states can be bound to
decisions against their will, QMV rules have not been extended to most
sovereignty-sensitive areas, such as taxation, common foreign and security
policy, and the revision of EU treaties.48 QMV has the upside that it keeps
international institutions functional. The downside is that it binds the unwilling.
In this sense, any majority voting represents a departure from the fundamental
principle of consent in international law.49 It is therefore not surprising that the
EU-which is unique in its extent of supranational powers-is a rare example of
an institution that has gradually moved towards QMV and thus embraced the
idea of homogenization by way of an explicit override of states' preferences.
Imposing extensive accession conditions, buying consent through transfer
payments, and overriding uncooperative states' preferences via majority voting
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But note that the leverage to extract concessions in the case of club goods can sometimes be used
to make up for the lack of similar leverage in these other areas. For instance, trade agreements can
be used to entice a country to sign onto a (non-club good) international organization.
Anu Bradford, InternationalAntitrustNegodations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J.
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negotiations in the WTO).
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rules all have the downside that they may reduce reluctant member states'
incentives to eventually comply. A state is more inclined to defect from the
commitments that it has undertaken unwillingly. In these instances,
homogenization may still occur but it may require cooperative members to
spend resources devoted to monitoring and enforcement. Ultimately, institutions
with enforcement capacities can attempt to force homogenization through
international courts and dispute settlement bodies. For instance, if an EU
member state refuses to comply with a directive that emerged when its
preferences were overridden in a QMV process, the Commission or another
member state can initiate proceedings before the ECJ, which has the ability to
impose sanctions for noncompliance. Similarly, if China violates the TRIPS
Agreement, infringing the interests of US companies, the US can challenge the
violation before the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. The WTO's Dispute
Settlement Body can then order China to comply, ultimately by authorizing
retaliation." In this way, courts can be harnessed to enforce the bargains states
have made to curtail heterogeneity costs.
At times, courts can go further than to enforce bargains embedded in
constitutive treaties of their organizations. They can occasionally be viewed as
independent actors with activist agendas that serve to suppress heterogeneity
costs and deepen the mandates of the institutions. The European Court of
Human Rights, for instance, interprets the European Convention of Human
Rights (ECHR) in light of the principle of "European consensus."" This
principle permits the Court to rely on the member states' subsequent human
rights practices as an interpretive technique for the "living" Convention.
However, the notion of consensus can rest on the subsequent practices of the
majority, as opposed to all, of the ECHR members. Thus, respondent countries
whose practices deviate from that of the majority are homogenized by way of
the ECHR imposing the European consensus on them.52 The ECJ and the
WTO's DSM have similarly been praised or accused-depending on one's
perspective-of stepping in with activist rulings, particularly when political
decisionmaking has been deadlocked. The deepening of the EU and the WTO's
agendas and powers may thus at least at times reflect the integrationist (and thus
homogenizing) rulings of the courts, which are largely detached from the decree
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However, even then, China has the option of engaging in "efficient breach," enduring retaliation
instead of complying with the specific obligations. Thus, courts-with the possible exception of
an hence be seen imperfect in their ability to engage in consent tailoring.
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of heterogeneity costs that impede effective political decisionmaking." This way,
courts can also be viewed as engaging in consent tailoring that lead to deeper
institutions notwithstanding the preferences of (part of their) membership.
2. Institutional tailoring.
The previous discussion acknowledged that consent tailoring is not
absolute even at the accession stage. The leverage that incumbent members have
over prospective members depends on the extent to which the former versus
the latter benefit from accession. If the gains from the accession accrue primarily
to existing members, the prospective member may not agree to extensive
conditions. Reservation prices differ from one prospective member to another.
While the EU may be able to impose tough conditions on Romania or
Macedonia, it may not be able to extract the same conditions from, say, wealthy
and self-reliant Norway. Thus, even at the accession stage, incumbent states may
occasionally need to accommodate the newcomer. Similarly, consent tailoring
may not be available against existing member states. Issue linkages are not
always available, feasible, or acceptable. For most sensitive issues, voting rules
are likely to continue to call for unanimity. In such instances, every member state
retains a veto and uncooperative states' preferences cannot be overridden by a
QMV. Finally, courts can advance the institution's goals with activist rulings, but
are aware of potential political backlash from doing so, and exercise self-restraint
as a result.
In these situations, one possible outcome is that an institution comes to a
halt, forcing states to forgo further benefits from cooperation. However, this is
likely to lead to underprovision of public goods, which is costly and thus
normatively undesirable. In these instances, the most reluctant member state
gets to set the pace for cooperation and determine the boundaries of the
institution. It may therefore be preferable to accommodate the uncooperative
member in the absence of the ability to homogenize its preferences. Thus, an
institution is forced to adjust by accommodating the preferences of an
uncooperative member state as opposed to the other way around.
Institutional tailoring presents the opportunity to accommodate
uncooperative members in the absence of the power to dominate them. The key
to institutional tailoring is that it moves the institution away from equal and
universal obligations. This can be accomplished by allowing members to assume
common but differentiated responsibilities ("CDRs")54 or, alternatively, by
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pursuing differentiated integration through opt-outs." Allowing for coalitions of
the willing that negotiate treaties within treaties or form clubs within clubs also
constitutes a strategy of institutional tailoring." These instances typically reflect
the cooperative members' reduced bargaining leverage yet also an
acknowledgement that net benefits of even this type of more limited
cooperation still exist.
Differentiated obligations are a well-accepted feature of international law."
CDRs are commonly extended to developing countries that have a diminished
capacity to assume full obligations under WTO trade agreements. CDRs are also
prevalent in international environmental law where countries' obligations are
adjusted to take into account their capacity to comply with costly
commitments." The key idea underlying CDRs is that all member states
participate in the institution, but on different terms. Generally CDRs are
explained by distributional concerns and justified by a notion of fairness.
Rationalist arguments, however, also support their employment. Differential
obligations enable for a more optimal equilibrium to be reached: it is preferable
to allow a subset of countries to assume a lower level of obligations as opposed
to lowering every state's obligations to the level that is acceptable by the least
cooperative member state. Institutional tailoring as a tool for optimizing the
size/heterogeneity trade-off thereby offers an efficiency justification for CDRs.
Michael Gilligan, who has argued that no trade-off between size and
heterogeneity exists as long as states participating in institutionalized cooperation
can set their policies at different levels, indirectly supports this view. 9 Large
membership can therefore be consistent with deep obligations as long as the
institution forgoes the idea of identical obligations that are universally applied to
all of its members.
A more far-reaching technique of institutional accommodation is the
decision to allow for suspension of uncooperative member's obligations or
complete opt-out from treaties. Reservations are a common feature of
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international law and international organizations typically accommodate a range
of opt-outs. The commitments under the WTO treaties can be suspended by
invoking the GATT's escape clause, allowing a member to pursue safeguards
measures that put aside their original commitments."o The EU's Charter of
Fundamental Rights accommodated opt-outs for the UK and Poland." Similarly,
the Schengen Agreement proceeded despite the resistance of the UK and
Ireland, ultimately allowing them to stay outside of the zone abolishing internal
border controls.
The above examples reflect forms of institutional tailoring where the
default norm is for all members of the institution to participate in cooperation
while allowing for some uncooperative members to not assume these same
obligations (and, as a corollary, often to not enjoy these same rights). A more
far-reaching form of institutional tailoring is the situation where the default
norm is, at least initially, the reverse. For example, the WTO's Government
Procurement Agreement initially brought together only a limited number of
WTO members pursuing deeper cooperation with respect to certain issue areas
while the great majority of the WTO membership remained outside of the
agreement.62
A common defense for the existence of opt-outs and differentiated
integration is their ability to mitigate political conflict-that they are better than
not pursuing cooperation at all. But these arrangements may also reflect firstbest arrangements in that they maximize the net gains from cooperation. A
compelling normative defense for opt-outs and differentiated integration is their
ability to facilitate optimization of the size/heterogeneity trade-off. These
strategies allow for a higher level of cooperation to take place where the
uncooperative members do not get to set the boundaries of the institution and
water down the entire cooperative enterpnse.
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3. The choice between consent tailoring and institutional tailoring.
When faced with a deadlock where some member states are seeking to
deepen cooperation while others are resisting, the key question is whether the
cooperative members should tailor the preferences of the uncooperative
members to conform to the goals of the institution-consent tailoring-or
whether they should tailor the institution and its policies to the diverse
preferences of its members-institutional tailoring.
choose homogenization over
When do cooperative members
accommodation? The likely answer is "whenever they can." Institutional
tailoring reduces gains from cooperation relative to full cooperation. States are
therefore likely to favor consent tailoring over institutional tailoring each time
this strategy is available for them. When cooperative members have full leverage
over uncooperative members, the size/heterogeneity trade-off fails to
materialize. Bargaining power dictates outcomes and uncooperative members are
not able to obstruct the deepening of cooperation. Under this scenario,
cooperative members can always homogenize uncooperative members. Further,
they can do so without incurring any costs; they can freely expand gains from
cooperation without the need to adjust the point of cooperation to the
preferences of other members. But as discussed, homogenization is not always
available. At times, cooperative members are forced to yield, accommodating the
preferences of uncooperative members by agreeing to differentiated obligations
or allowing for the reduction of gains through opt-outs. Whether
homogenization or accommodation takes place depends on the relative
bargaining power of the cooperative and uncooperative states at any given time
on any given issue.
Consent tailoring and institutional tailoring are likely to take place in
succession as institutions evolve. Institutions are often initially formed among a
small group of like-minded states. In the beginning, these states cooperate on
issues where their preferences are closely aligned. Thus, institutions often start
out without any discernible size/heterogeneity trade-off that would undermine
their ability to facilitate cooperation. Differences only begin to surface as states
gradually seek to deepen or widen the institution. Consent tailoring is often
enough to accomplish widening or deepening in the early days of the institution.
New members are homogenized at the accession stage to the extent possible.
When needed, transfer payments are employed to buy the new or existing
members' consent. But as heterogeneity further increases, states are forced to
look for new ways to suppress preference heterogeneity. They may do this by
changing voting rules to relinquish unanimity. With respect to some issues or
some members, however, giving up the veto right is not acceptable. Sovereignty
costs are simply too high in comparison to the benefits of institutionalized
cooperation. Here, states are more protective of their own ability to veto
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cooperation when needed when compared to the expected costs of the other
states' exercise of their veto power on other issues.
Eventually, in this sequence of strategies, consent tailoring meets its limits
and institutional tailoring is triggered. There is a point at which heterogeneity
costs become so palpable that the preferences of the minority can no longer be
tailored to those of the majority. As a result, cooperative states move to
institutional tailoring. Of course, in an ins.titution that embraces multiple issues,
cooperative states may be able to continue to homogenize uncooperative
members in some areas while being forced to accommodate them in other areas,
depending on the relative bargaining power of the two groups in each issue area.
But as a general trend, often institutions are forced to move from
homogenization to accommodation over time.
Ultimately, once a certain threshold of preference diversity is reached and
the strategy of consent tailoring is exhausted, CDRs, opt-outs, and cooperation
by coalitions become the norm. Clubs within clubs begin to emerge. These new
cooperative coalitions are likely to be initiated by powerful states that have the
ability to "go it alone," and hence benefit from the creation of a new club even if
the others failed to join them." Gradually, as the importance of that club grows,
other states may seek access to it in order to avoid incurring the costs of
exclusion from the club. This happened in the case of the Government
Procurement Agreement in the WTO as well as the Schengen Agreement and
the Eurozone in Europe.
Such a club is also likely to gradually gain more bargaining power vis-a-vis
the initially excluded members (or those that are initially unwilling or unable to
join) and thus regain the ability to homogenize outsiders that seek to join that
coalition at a later date. The Schengen Agreement, for instance, changed the
incentive structure for outsiders once it was established by creating a single focal
point for cooperation." Outsiders were suddenly limited to two options: joining
the Schengen or rejecting passport-free travel within Europe altogether. The
Schengen Agreement also created new costs for those remaining outside by
imposing more stringent border controls for travel from outside of Schengen.
Thus, the number of members in the initially small coalition is likely to grow
through consent tailoring over time. This strategy is likely to be employed until
the club widens and cooperation deepens to a point where institutional tailoring
is once again prompted. Thus, we may observe another cycle during which an
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institution evolves through a sequence of consent tailoring and institutional
tailoring as small clubs develop into larger clubs over time.
The recognition of this dynamic does not, however, entail that it is always
optimal for an institution to continue to widen and/or deepen. An optimal point
of cooperation may be reached where it is not worth adding new members or
where the equilibrium depth of cooperation has been reached. The above
discussion has merely suggested that simultaneous deepening and widening, if
desirable, can be feasible. It has also offered an analytical framework to
understand how states can optimize the size/heterogeneity trade-off over time
through the dual strategy of consent tailoring and institutional tailoring and
unpacked the conditions under which one strategy is likely to prevail over the
other.
IV. LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
The above discussion invites several qualifications and extensions, only
some of which can be addressed here. To start with qualifications, consent
tailoring and institutional tailoring are common yet imperfect strategies for
optimization. Thus, they do not guarantee that an optimal size of an institution
is reached or maintained. Consider consent tailoring first. At the accession stage,
cooperative states may push consent tailoring too far. They can miscalculate
what can be accomplished with this strategy. Ultimately, they can alienate
prospective members altogether, reducing the gains from cooperation." They
might also undermine their own leverage for (future) consent tailoring if they
"cheapen" the accession standard by occasionally letting in states too early, or by
failing to enforce some of the agreed upon accession conditions against
defecting member states post-accession. Both instances send signals about the
credibility of the admission standards, potentially compromising the future use
of the accession criteria as a tool for consent tailoring. Consent tailoring via
transfer payments also carries the risk of suboptimal outcomes. For example,
states may have the incentive to falsely portray themselves as uncooperative to
extract a higher price in return for their cooperation.
Institutional tailoring is similarly complex and subject to errors. Allowing
clubs within clubs to emerge may seem optimal for a certain policy area but at
times fails to remain such when linkages to other policy areas become better
understood. The formation of the Eurozone, for instance, did not turn out to be
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an optimal currency area in no small part because it was not accompanied by a
similar decree of delegation of authority in fiscal matters. The case of the Euro
illustrates that the optimization of size/heterogeneity trade-off calls for more
intricate calculations given the potential linkages across policy domains. Thus,
the above discussion should not be read to suggest that the current make up of
institutions would reflect successful optimization of the size/heterogeneity
trade-off.
Related complexities arise from the difficulty to calculate the expected net
benefits from institutionalized cooperation due to elusive linkages between
different policy domains. Calculating the net benefits of admitting China into the
WTO, for instance, was complicated by existing disagreements on the extent and
magnitude of expected positive externalities associated with China's
membership. China's entry was known to establish a larger free trade area with
unambiguous benefits for all members. But China's membership also carried
more tenuous (but potentially substantial) benefits if China's commitment to
economic opening were to pave way for political reforms as well.67
Informational asymmetries hence also stand in the way of perfect optimization.
The idea of "flexible design" is inherent in the theory of optimal size of
institutions. Aware of the trade-off, rational states are expected to adjust the
membership of the institution to optimize the net gains from cooperation. But
this flexibility is limited because, in practice, the flexible design only allows
movement to one direction: towards more members and deeper cooperation.
Institutions, once established, tend to be sticky. States rarely leave institutionsin particular institutions that produce club goods-as the experiences of the EU,
the WTO or NATO suggest." Competencies of these institutions are also rarely
rolled back. The adjustment of the depth and width is hence often a one-way
street and decisions are difficult to reverse ex post. Evolution of an institution
can typically just halt or go forward. If there is a backlash, we rarely see states
dismantle or leave institutions. Given the inherent stickiness of membership, the
impending vote in the UK on whether to leave the EU can be seen as all the
more monumental and as an important test case for the sustainability of the twoway flexibility.

67

See Paolo D. Farah, Five Years of China's IVTO Membershi,

33 LEGAL ISSUES OF EcON.

INTEGRATION 263, 264-67 (2009).
68

However, outside of club goods, institutions' membership can be less sticky. The US withdrew
from UNESCO in 1984, from ILO in 1975 (only to return in 1980); the Statute of the
International Court of Justice allows states parties to opt into recognizing certain types of
decisions as Osofacto compulsory. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat 1055, 3 Bevans 1153; see also KONSTANTINOs D. MAGLIVERAS, ExcLusION FROM
PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONs 65, 194-201 (1999).

78

Vol 15 No. 1

How InternationalInstitutionsEvolve

Bradford

When states come to realize that the international institution has clearly
exceeded its optimal size and become dysfunctional, states cannot easily adjust
the size of the institution by way of exit or expulsion. Instead, in such situations
members typically leave the institution intact but move their cooperative activity
outside the institution." This raises an additional question of when states choose
to form a new institution outside the existing one as opposed to pursue
differentiated integration within an existing cooperative framework. For
instance, a group of WTO members are currently negotiating an International
Services Agreement ("ISA") outside of the WTO, departing from the model of
GPA and other plurilateral agreements that the WTO has traditionally
accommodated.70 One way to understand an agreement like the ISA is to view its
negotiation outside of the WTO as a way to restart the process of consent
tailoring and restore the optimal size of an institution given the costs and
benefits associated with such an agreement. Yet it is unclear why cooperative
states adopted a view that they could not accomplish the same within the
existing institutional framework. This question whether clubs are formed outside
or inside exiting institutions is closely related, but is beyond the focus of this
short intervention. It is, however, an issue where a transaction-costs approach to
international organizations can potentially advance the analysis.
This Article has focused on the dual strategy of consent tailoring and
institutional tailoring. In doing so, it has focused on the choice as well as the
sequence of strategies that states employ to maximize net gains from
cooperation while being constrained by heterogeneity costs. However, this
inquiry of optimal sequencing of consent tailoring and institutional tailoring is
different from the question of optimal sequencing of widening and deepening of
an institution. A few remarks regarding the latter here can help spur that
discussion, though a more careful analysis falls outside the scope of this short
Article. Because of the leverage incumbent members enjoy at the accession
stage, they are likely to have an incentive to deepen the institution in anticipation
of enlargement. If the institution contemplates accepting new members and
expanding cooperation to new areas, cooperative members may strategically
sequence deepening just before widening to facilitate the process of deepening.
This way, they may rely on consent tailoring and avoid having to extend transfer
payments in return for new members' cooperation later on or, more
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problematically, agree to more costly institutional adjustment that leaves them
with fewer gains from cooperation.
However, the sequencing may be reversed in instances where
uncooperative members hold greater bargaining power. The UK, for instance,
may well support the EU's enlargement precisely because it seeks to obstruct
future deepening. Knowing that deepening is less likely (or, as has been argued
here, possible, but more costly) in the presence of larger membership and higher
heterogeneity costs, the UK may have the incentive to endorse widening before
any efforts to deepen cooperation within the EU. Thus the choice of optimal
sequencing between widening and depending can depend on whether the
cooperative or uncooperative members hold the leverage over the decision on
whether to pursue one or the other first.
V. CONCLUSION
After World War II, states responded to increasing global integration by
forming international institutions. Institutions were meant to solve various
cooperation and coordination problems. Since their inception, membership in
these institutions has grown and agendas have become more complex. Growing
heterogeneity within institutions has led to increasing deadlocks, which have
undermined multilateral cooperation and the effectiveness of institutions. This
Article has offered an analytical framework to understand how states cooperate,
and how institutions evolve in the face of this growing preference heterogeneity
within their membership. The economic logic underlying the formation of
institutions suggests that simultaneous widening and deepening of institutions is
unattainable because of the trade-off between increased size and growing
heterogeneity within institutions. Yet, all around us, we have observed
institutions embrace new members and expand their mandate over time. The
goal of this Article has been to explain why and how.
This Article has argued that states have successfully widened and deepened
institutions by systematically employing two strategies: consent tailoring and
institutional tailoring. Both strategies are aimed at suppressing heterogeneity
costs. Whether states choose to homogenize uncooperative member states
through consent tailoring or accommodate them through institutional tailoring is
determined by the relative bargaining power of the cooperative and
uncooperative members of the institution on a given issue at a given time.
However, as preference heterogeneity within an institution grows over time,
institutional tailoring is likely to dominate consent tailoring. Ultimately,
differentiated integration-an element of institutional tailoring-becomes a
prevalent feature of multilateral cooperation. Framed this way, the
size/heterogeneity trade-off can offer a dynamic explanation for how
institutions evolve as opposed to a merely static theory of an optimal size of
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states or institutions. In other words, this trade-off not only determines the
optimal size of an institution but also sets off a series of the adjustment
strategies and determines their sequence and, consequently, progression of the
institution.
The discussion has implications across areas of international law. It raises
some new questions but also allows us to revisit old debates with a new
analytical framework. For instance, one of the long-standing debates in
international trade law this past decade has been whether bilateral and regional
preferential trade agreements ("PTAs") are welfare-enhancing. Traditionally, the
inquiry has focused on the degree to which such agreements lead to trade
creation versus trade diversion. But as PTAs today are increasingly deep in terms
of their substantive coverage, a better way to analyze their desirability might be
to assess them in light of the size/heterogeneity trade-off. Their scope may not
indicate that they are "second best" agreements. We may also not want to see
them expand to embrace a great number of states. Such expansion would likely
come at the cost of the depth of the commitments. In the end, whether any
particular PTA reflects an optimal size requires a detailed understanding of the
benefits available under any given size, heterogeneity costs that limit the parties
ability to obtain those benefits under any given size, and strategies available for
the parties to manage and overcome those heterogeneity costs via consent
tailoring and institutional tailoring-both initially as well as over time as the
institution evolves.
The above discussion also contributes to our understanding of the
relationship between international law and state power. The interplay between
consent tailoring and institutional tailoring explains how powerful states seek to
maintain their leverage in international institutions even when the balance of
power becomes more dispersed. While at first glance, today's international
cooperation seems to mark the decline of powerful states' bargaining leverage,
another way to think about institutional tailoring is that it merely reinstates
powerful states' control over institutions. As power becomes more dispersed
and consent tailoring less successful, powerful states simply abandon traditional
multilateralism and proceed to cooperate in the form of coalitions of the willing.
The idea of building "institutions within institutions" can have the effect of
restarting the process of institutional change, restoring the ability of powerful
states to override the consent of uncooperative members and thus move the
institution towards a new equilibrium between the benefits of size and costs of
heterogeneity. Thus, the primary beneficiaries of differentiated integration are
often the large and powerful countries who simply have found another way to
reinstate their control of institutions and outcomes.
This Article has offered a descriptive analysis on institutional change. Yet
the discussion has several normative implications, two of which stand out. First,
differentiated integration is conventionally thought of as being a suboptimal or
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the "second best" solution to institutional cooperation. Opt-outs and escape
clauses are claimed to weaken the institution. Clubs within clubs are seen
desirable only to the extent that they pave the possibility for a more inclusive
cooperation in the future. Genuine multilateralism thus often remains the
ultimate goal. However, if one takes the size/heterogeneity trade-off seriously,
no single optimal size or scope for an institution exists. Instead, different issues
within an institution call for a different number of participating states depending
on the relative magnitude of gains and heterogeneity costs. Consent tailoring and
institutional tailoring allow countries to optimally tradeoff between economies
of scale and preference heterogeneity in each area of cooperation. Differentiated
integration hence makes institutions more effective by eliminating holdout
problems, while leaving them at the same time more legitimate by preserving
sovereignty. While critics may claim that differentiated integration makes
institutions less inclusive, the converse may also be true as states are permitted
to join institutions even if they are not capable or willing to assume all or
identical obligations. Thus, differentiated integration can be normatively
defended as a desirable end goal of international cooperation.
At the same time, institutional tailoring and differentiated integration carry
distinct risks. Today, the question of multitier governance is particularly acute
for Europe. The severe problems underlying the Eurozone show that a large
membership is not necessarily optimal. Admitting fiscally weak members has
increased the heterogeneity costs of the currency union, deeply dividing the
interests of the debtor and creditor countries. These divisions have not been
matched with transaction costs savings that broader membership should deliver.
Going forward, while there continues to be a core set of EU policies and
principles that all countries will likely share, in a large number of policy areas the
EU must either retreat and slow the pace of integration or allow for varying
clubs within the club to emerge. The biggest test yet to come is the ability (or
desirability) of the EU's Eurozone members to move towards greater fiscal
integration-as some predict to be inevitable-while leaving the institutional
structure of the broader EU intact.
Second, an enhanced understanding of how institutions evolve invites us to
rethink some of the fundamental principles on which international law and the
legitimacy of international institutions are conventionally thought to rest. This
Article has suggested that when international institutions evolve, they cannot
accomplish the two fundamental principles of international law-state consent
and universality-at the same time." After a certain threshold of preference
71
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diversity within an institution has been reached, either the need for genuine
consent or universality needs to give. Consent tailoring compromises the
principle of consent whereas institutional tailoring compromises uniformity and
thereby the idea of universal rights and obligations. Only if institutions are large
and shallow can consent and universality coexist. But institutions that seek to
both widen and deepen can only do so by either moving away from one or the
other.
This observation invites us to rethink the international institutions as
presenting a design choice among three principal variables: consensus,
universality, and effectiveness. In this triangle, two principles can coexist yet
never all three. The three variables are all interrelated, making it impossible to
optimize on all three at the same time. In the presence of this "triple constraint"
or the "international law triangle," one principle must always give, presenting
members with a crucial choice pertaining to the institutional design.72 Universal
institutions operating based on the principle of consensus cannot remain
effective-yet regaining effectiveness would require relaxing the principle
consensus or, alternatively, forgoing universal obligations. Consensus-based
institutions seeking to effectively constrain state behavior cannot do so while
continuing to strive for universal membership-limiting the size of the
institution becomes inevitable every time consensus and effectiveness are
prioritized. Yet if the universal membership remains a foundational value for the
institution, decisionmaking must move away from consensus, else forgo
effective decisionmaking and become capable of only generating inconsequential
decisions reflecting the preferences of the most resistant voter.
A potential new avenue for international law and economics scholarshipboth theoretical and empirical-would be to enhance our understanding of the
rational design of international institutions with this triangle of consensus,
universality, and effectiveness in mind. This research would allow us to better
explain and predict the various institutional patterns as a function of the distinct
(yet inevitably varying) hierarchy across these three principles. It could also help
us unpack the economic and political conditions under which each principle is
sacrificed-as an inevitable consequence of embracing the other twoproviding an opportunity to re-examine the very foundations on which
international law is conventionally thought to rest.
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international institutions, the inverse relationship between the presences of these two principles
becomes more palpable.
This argument mirrors and directly borrows from the concept known as "project management
triangle," a model that identifies three variables central to any project: fast, good, and cheap. Any
project can accomplish any two-but always at the cost of forgoing the third one.
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